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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case. 
This is the reply brief of the Idaho Department of Transportation (hereinafter referred to 
as "the Department"). The Department has appealed District Court Judge John Stegner' s 
decision setting aside an Administrative License Suspension (ALS) of William Trottier's driving 
privileges and setting aside an Administrative Lifetime Disqualification of Mr. Trottier's 
Commercial Driving Privileges (CDL DQ). The two Petitions for Judicial Review have been 
consolidated on appeal. 
b. Factual Statement. 
The factual statements contained in the Department's Opening Brief and Mr. Trottier's 
Respondent's Brief sufficiently advise the Court of the facts of this matter. Numerous factual 
references to the Record follow in the Department's Reply Brief. 
c. References to the Record. 
For purposes of this argument the Record in Supreme Court Case No. 39994-2012 is 
cited as the "ALS R." The Record in Supreme Court Case No. 39949-2012 is cited as the "CDL 
R." 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The Department characterized two issues on appeal: 
1. Legal cause exists to stop Mr. Trottier' s vehicle. 
2. The administrative disqualification of Mr. Trottier' s Commercial Driving privileges 
was appropriate. 
Mr. Trottier asks the Court to also consider the following additional issues on appeal 
pursuant to IAR 35(b)(4): 
1. The circumstances of the pretest monitoring prior to the administration of the 
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evidentiary test for breath alcohol was sufficient. 
2. The presentation of additional evidence in the Commercial Driver's License 
Disqualification case. 
3. Whether the lifetime disqualification of Commercial Driving Privileges violates 
procedural and substantive due process. 
III. ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1 
Legal cause exists to stop Mr. Trottier 's vehicle. 
Legal cause as used in I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(1) requires an objective manifestation that the 
person stopped "is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." The reasonableness of that 
suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the 
motor vehicle stop, State v. Emory, l 19 Idaho 661, 809 P.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1991). 1 
As the court indicates in Emory, id there needs to some distinguishingly susp1c10us 
characteristics of the driving pattern to provide legal cause to effect a traffic stop. Mr. Trottier' s 
driving more than meets the factual analysis set out in Emory, id. 
The driving pattern observed in Emmy consisted of: 
When the light turned green, Emory's vehicle failed to move for five to six seconds. The officer 
followed Emory's vehicle, which proceeded correctly through another green light. On the next 
block of Thirteenth Street, the available road space became narrower due to a long line of parked 
vehicles. The officer observed Emory driving straight but very close to the parked vehicles. The 
officer then decided to stop Emory and he turned on his overhead lights. 
The Court analyzed Mr. Emory's driving as follows: 
It is self-evident that motorists often pause at a stop sign or traffic light when their attention is 
distracted or preoccupied by outside influences. Moreover, the fact that the stop occurred in the 
early morning hours does not enhance the suspicious nature of the observation. Likewise, driving 
a vehicle within one foot of parked cars on a narrow street is equally insignificant. Emory was 
driving a relatively large vehicle along a narrow street marked with a centerline. Emory's vehicle 
was in its proper lane and was moving in a straight line down the street. No weaving or crossing of 
the center dividing line was observed by the officer. Such conduct can hardly be described as 
suspicious. 
State v. Emmy, 1191daho 661, 809 P.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1991). 
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The circumstances of Trooper Schwecke's observation of Mr. Trottier's vehicle are 
recorded (ALS R. Exhibit A). Mr. Trottier is observed to make a wide tum, failing to stay in the 
curbside lane, drive in the middle of the road and move from the middle of the road to the 
outside or curbside lane without signaling. 
The legal cause standard has been analyzed m the ALS setting to require a similar 
reasonable suspicion. 2 
Mr. Trottier's reference to the Ciihbar Court's discussion of the relationship of legal cause 
and probable cause pertains to with the police officer's legal cause to request that the driver 
submit to an evidentiary test (LC. § l 8-8002A(7)(b)) not legal cause to support the stop of 
Gibbar's vehicle which is at issue here, (LC. § 18-8002A(7)(a)). 
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal 
behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary 
to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, IOI S.Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 
628-29 (1981); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct.App.1998). The 
reasonableness of the suspicion must be *943 ** l l 82 evaluated upon the totality of the 
circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 
(Ct.App.1999). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than 
mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. Id An officer may draw reasonable 
inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the 
officer's experience and law enforcement training. State v. Montague, l 14 Idaho 319, 321, 756 
P.2d 1083, I 085 (Ct.App.1988). Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the conduct observed 
by the officer fell within the broad range of what can be described as nom1al driving behavior. 
Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. 
In re Suspension a/Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 942-43, 155 P.3d 1176, 1181-82 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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Here Trooper Schwecke reports that his stop of Mr. Trottier's vehicle is as a result of a 
violation of LC. § 49-644(1) (ALS. R. p. 032). 3 
The driving pattern of Mr. Trottier is before the Hearing Examiner without any 
explanation from Mr. Trottier. The Hearing Examiner was then free to make any conclusion 
reasonably based on the Record before him. The Hearing Examiner viewed the video recording 
of Mr. Trottier's driving consistent with Trooper Schwecke's report. It is clear that Mr. Trottier 
does not maintain his vehicle's travel in the curbside or outside lane after having made a right 
turn from C Street on to Main Street in downtown Moscow. Considering the relationship of 
Trooper Schwecke's vehicle and Mr. Trottier's vehicle, Mr. Trottier is in the middle of Main 
Street straddling the two lanes of traffic not in the outside or curbside Lane. Mr. Trottier then 
crosses the lane divider and moves over into the curbside lane without signaling. There is then 
sufficient evidence in the record supporting the Hearing Examiner's conclusion that legal cause 
existed to stop Mr. Trottier's vehicle. 4 
The Hearing Examiner had before him Trooper Schwecke report specifically indicating 
the basis for the stop (ALS R. Ex. A). The Hearing Examiner had the video recording of the 
3 Idaho Code § 49-644( I) provides: 
Both the approach for a right turn and the right turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand 
curb or edge of the roadway. 
See R. p. 032. 
1.1 Officer Schwecke stopped the vehicle driven by Trottier on September 3, 2011 at approximately 0214 
hours in Latah County, Idaho for an illegal turn, in violation of Idaho Code, § 49-644, and for failing to 
maintain its lane of travel, in violation of Idaho Code, § 49-637. 
1.2 Counsel for Trottier argues that no traffic violation can be discerned form a viewing of the driving on video 
recording. However, only part of the driving pattern occurs within view of the camera on the recording. 
Additionally, what can be seen appears to be a wide turn, crossing over the dashed lane dividers. The paint 
on the dashed lane dividers is faded but still discernible. 
1.3 Officer Schwecke had legal cause to stop the vehicle drive by Trottier. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, R. p. 06 l. 
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circumstances of the stop. The Hearing Examiner did not hear from Mr. Trottier, only argument 
as to what the Hearing Examiner should find. 
The Hearing Examiner makes findings consistent with what he considered. The Hearing 
Examiner is entitled to conclude that .\1r. Trottier engaged in a wide turn, straddling over the lane 
divider and moving back into the curbside lane without signaling. 
There is no testimony explaining why Mr. Trottier drove the way that is illustrated on the 
video recording. 
Mr. Trottier has the burden initially to show the Department's Hearing Examiner that 
there was no legal cause for the stop, LC. § 18-8002A(7)(a). Failing to have done so, Mr. 
Trottier has the burden initially upon judicial review to demonstrate that there is not a reasonable 
basis for the Hearing Examiner's conclusion. 5 
The District Court instead of attempting to determine whether there is more than a 
scintilla of evidence supporting the Hearing Examiner's conclusion, simply makes his own 
factual findings including considering evidence which was not made part of the record. 
In other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where 
there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex rel. Bd. of 
Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a 
conclusion. Kinney v. Tupperware Co., ll 7 Idaho 765, 769, 792 P.2d 330, 334 (1990). Substantial 
evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. 
Masterson v. Idaho Dept. ofTransp., 150 Idaho 126, 128, 244 P.3d 625, 627 (Ct. App. 2010). 
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The trial court concludes that the condition of the lane dividers is attributable to motor 
vehicle traffic making the right turn the same way that Mr. Trottier did and therefore the tum was 
as practicable as necessary LC. §49-446(1).6 
Such is not the role of the district court on judicial review. 1'vfarshall v. Department of 
Transp., 137 Idaho 337, 48 P.3d 666 (Ct.App. 2002) and LC. § 67-5279. 
When the District Court indicates that it cannot see what the Hearing Examiner saw, the 
requisite deference required of the District Court on judicial review is not demonstrated. 
Mr. Trottier does not meet his burden to demonstrate that there was no legal cause by 
inviting the Hearing Examiner's view of the video recording without any additional evidence 
being offered by Yfr. Trottier. 
There is more than sufficient legal cause for the stop of Mr. Trottier's vehicle. 
ISSUE 2 
The Commercial Driver's License Disqualification is appropriate. 
Idaho Code § 49-335(2) provides that Yfr. Trottier's Commercial Driving Privileges will 
be disqualified if Mr. Trottier has submitted to and failed "a test to determine the drivers alcohol 
concentration while operating a motor vehicle." 
4 The statute requires clearly marked lanes. I 
5 don'tthinkthey're clearly marked to begin with. I don't 
6 think that !vtr. Trottier drove across them, and to the extent 
7 that they're not clearly marked, there's not been a violation 
8 of the statute. And to the extent that they're not clearly 
9 marked, it suggests to me that others drove in the way that 
l 0 Schwecke thinks that Mr. Trottier drove and therefore if 
11 everybody is doing it, it's not a reasonable and articulable 
12 suspicious behavior that would justify being stopped. 
Tr. p. 41 LL. 4-12 
The District Court only analyzes LC. § 49-637 which is referred by the Hearing Examiner, see FN 4 but is not the 
Idaho Code authority referenced by Trooper Schwecke. Trooper Schwecke says the basis for the stop was a 
violation ofI.C. § 49-644( I), R. p. 032. 
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The Department's Hearing Examiner concluded that Mr. Trottier' s failure of two 
evidentiary tests for breath alcohol was a sufficient basis to disqualify Mr. Trottier's Commercial 
Driving Privileges. 
At the time the Department's Hearing Examiner considered Mr. Trottier' s Commercial 
Driving Privileges, Mr. Trottier had failed two evidentiary tests for breath alcohol. 
The Administrative License Suspension resulting from the evidentiary test failure had 
been stayed, however, the resulting suspension had not been vacated or set aside (See CDL R. 
pp. 56-57, Hearing Examiner's Findings IV, V & VI). 7 
Should the Administrative License Suspension be set aside, as a result of some defect in 
the circumstances of administration of the evidentiary breath test for alcohol, the Commercial 
Driver's License Disqualification Hearing Examiner indicates that the lifetime disqualification of 
Mr. Trottier's Commercial Driving Privileges would not be imposed (Specifically, see Finding 
V, FN 7). 
IV. 
The driver had a separate administrative hearing on the administrative license suspension issued on 
September 3, 201 l, and the suspension was upheld. That decision is currently on appeal to the district 
court and the district court entered an order dated October 6, 20 l 1, staying the Findings of Fact And 
Conclusions of Law and Order and the enforcement of the administrative license suspension, but the 
suspension has not been vacated or set aside. 
V. 
Idaho Code, Section 49-104(14 )(b) provides that for purposes of disqualification or withdrawal of 
commercial vehicle driving privileges that an unvacated determination that a person has violated the law, 
which would include a finding that the person had violated Idaho Code, Section l 8-8002A, is a conviction 
for purposes of disqualifying commercial privileges, even though the same is on appeal. 
VI. 
The disqualification of the driver's commercial driving privileges is a consequence unique to 
commercial drivers that resulted from his failure of the breath test and is in addition to any consequences 
contained in Idaho Code, Section 18-8002A. 
Findings ofFact, CDL R. pp. 56-57. 
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Should the Court find that Mr. Trottier has met his burden pursuant to I.C. § 18-
8002A(7)(a-e) then according to the Department's Hearing Examiner, there is no basis for the 
Department to take action under I.C. § 49-335, that is, there is not a failed evidentiary test. 
This is not to suggest that the proceedings pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A(7) and LC. § 49-
335 are inexorably connected, inconsistent with the decisions in Buell v. Idaho Dept. ofTransp., 
151Idaho257, 254 P.3d 1253 (Ct. App. 2011), Wanner v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 150 Idaho 
164, 244P.3d1250 (2011) and Williams v. State, 283 P.3d 127 (Ct. App. 2012). Instead, this 
Hearing Examiner indicates that if there is a failed evidentiary test, the Department will 
disqualify Mr. Trottier from the operation of a Commercial vehicle. If there is not a failed 
evidentiary test then the Department will not disqualify Mr. Trottier from the operation of a 
Commercial vehicle. 
The Administrative License Suspension resulting from a failed evidentiary test and the 
disqualification of Commercial Driving Privileges are as the Court has identified two separate 
administrative actions addressing two separate privileges associated with the operation of a 
motor vehicle, Buell, id. 
The lifetime disqualification of Mr. Trottier's driving privileges should be imposed. 
Additional Issues On Appeal. 
Mr. Trottier asks the Court to consider additional issues on appeal based on IAR 
35(b)(4). 8 
8 Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(4) provides: 
Additional Issues presented on Appeal. In the event the respondent contends that the issues presented on appeal 
listed in appellant's brief are insufficient, incomplete, or raise additional issues for review, the respondent may 
list additional issues presented on appeal in the same form as prescribed in Rule 35(a)(4) above. 
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The circumstances of the pretest monitoring would appear to be appropriately before the 
Court, IAR 15(a), IAR 35(b)(4). However, the due process challenge to the lifetime 
disqualification of Mr. Trottier's Commercial Driving Privileges and the request to supplement 
the record on judicial review are requests for affirmative relief. 
Mr. Trottier does not contend that the issues set out by the Department arc "insufficient, 
incomplete or raise additional issues for review." Instead Mr. Trottier without having filed a 
cross appeal, contends that there were issues which were not considered by the District Court 
that should be considered by this Court, should the Department prevail on its appeal of the 
District Court's decision (Respondent's Brief p. 6). 9 
Mr. Trottier is seeking affirmative relief when asking that the Court to supplement the 
administrative record or overturn the disqualification based on an argument of 
unconstitutionality contrary to IAR 15(a). Mr. Trottier seeks something more than to have the 
District Court's order affirmed on alternative grounds to the grounds cited by the District Court. 
In requesting that the Court consider whether any prejudice occurred to Mr. Trottier in 
the Hearing Examiner's or the District Court's apparent denial of his motion to present additional 
evidence or asking that the disqualification be set aside because of its unconstitutionality seeks 
affirmative relief not granted by the District Court. Since affirmative relief is being requested 
this Court should not consider those issues first set out in Mr. Trottier' s Respondent's Brief. 
District Judge Stegner during the hearing addressed only one of the issues raised by Mr. 
Trottier in his two (2) Petitions for Judicial Review. The court did not find it necessary in the 
ALS and CDL Petitions for Judicial Review to address the other issues that were raised by Mr. 
Trottier. These other issues are set forth specifically within Mr. Trottier's Brief, and are identified 
separately within Section II of this Brief as Additional Issues Raised on Appeal. 
Therefore, those issues are now before the Idaho Supreme Court on this appeal pursuant 
to JAR 35(b)(4) in the event the Court rules that Trooper Schwecke had legal cause to stop Mr. 
Trottier. 
Respondent Briet~ p. 6. 
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1. The circumstances of the pretest monitoring prior to the administration of the 
evidentiary test for breath alcohol lvas sufficient. 
The actual time of the pretest monitoring was substantially more than 15 minutes. The 
video recording of the circumstances of the administration of the evidentiary test for breath 
alcohol (ALS R. Ex. A) demonstrates that Trooper Schwecke checked Mr. Trottier's mouth at 
21 :22. For the next 21 minutes prior to the administration of the evidentiary test for mouth 
alcohol, Trooper Schwecke and another Idaho State Police Officer remained in close physical 
proximity to Mr. Trottier for the duration of the pretest monitoring. 
The entirety of the 21 minutes from the time that Trooper Schwecke checks Mr. 
Trottier' s mouth until the administration of the breath test is captured for at least eight minutes 
on video and the remaining 13 minutes on audio. During the entirety of that time Trooper 
Schwecke maintains a close physical proximity to Mr. Trottier with another officer viewing the 
circumstances of the test (ALS R. Ex. A). 
The Hearing Examiner's conclusions about the circumstances of the 15 minute 
monitoring are supported by the record. The fact that Trooper Schwecke may have indicated that 
he would commence the monitoring period after the advisory was read to Mr. Trottier does not 
affect the duration of the pretest monitoring period. Trooper Schwecke is heard at several places 
(02:37:00 and 02:38:44) to advise that the time of the end of the monitoring was close. 
Consistent with the court's decisions in Bennett v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 147 Idaho 141, 
206 P.3d 505 (Ct. App. 2009), Wilkinson v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 151 Idaho 784, 264 P.3d 680 
(Ct. App. 2011) and Peck v. State, Dept. Rf Transp., 153 Idaho 3 7, 278 P.3d 439 (Ct. App. 2012), 
Trooper Schwecke did what was necessary to 'detect belching or regurgitation into the mouth or 
the like', State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 988 P.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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Mr. Trottier really argues that Trooper Schwecke's conduct to meet the standard of a 
sufficient pretest monitoring requires Trooper Schwecke to stare fixedly at Ms. Kimbley. 10 
The question for the Court is whether the alleged non-compliance with the procedures of 
the Idaho State Police affects the breath sample offered for testing. The alleged nature of the 
non-compliance is not clear and at the most is de minimis. Neither is there any evidence that an 
event occurred affecting the breath test results. 
Mr. Trottier does not testify that he does anything which would affect the validity of the 
test results or would introduce mouth alcohol into the breath sample, Bennett, See also, People v. 
Ebert, 931NE2d 279, 401 Ill. App 3d 958 (2010). 
The purpose of the monitoring period is to reduce the effect of various conditions which 
might occur at the time of the arrest on the breath alcohol evidentiary test results. No such 
conditions were present here, Remsburg at 996, 341. 
The sufficiency of the monitoring is clearly consistent with the Idaho Breath Alcohol 
Standard Operating Procedures. 
10 
The Idaho Operator's Manual for the use of the Jntoximeter 3000 does not require that the observer 
never take his eyes off the subject, only that the subject be observed closely. Such an interpretation 
comports with the purpose of the Manual, which is to "reduce the risk of invalid test results from 
various conditions which might occur after the time of the arrest." Bradley, 120 Idaho at 569, 817 
P.2d at 1093. In this case, Officer Campbell was in the same room with Remsburg at all times and 
closely observed her for at least fifteen minutes directly preceding administration of the breath 
test. The fact that Campbell's attention was briefly diverted from staring at Remsburg while he 
read the advisory form to her and programmed the Intoximeter did not preclude his compliance 
with the mandatory fifteen-minute observation period. 
State v. Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338, 341, 882 P.2d 993, 396 (Ct.App. 1994). 
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The breath test results of .148 and .144 are within .02 and indicate that mouth alcohol is 
not present and did not contaminate Mr. Trottier's breath sample. 11 
2. Motion to present additional evidence in the Commercial Driver's License 
D . lifi . 12 zsqua z zcatzon case. 
Mr. Trottier contends that he should be able to supplement the Court's record with 
evidence that the Hearing Examiner in the Commercial Driver's License Disqualification case 
did not have. The Court on judicial review should not supplement or enlarge the record without 
being asked to consider any differences in the Record pursuant to I.C. § 67-5276. 
More importantly here since Mr. Trottier does not provide the District Court nor this 
Court with the evidence to be included in the record it is impossible to determine whether such 
evidence would be relevant and appropriate in the CDL proceeding. 13 
3. The lifetime disqual(fication does not violate procedural and substantive due process. 
The Idaho court has clearly indicated that the lifetime CDL disqualification does not 
violate due process, Buell v. Idaho Dept. of Transp., 151 Idaho 257, 254 P.3d 1253 (Ct. App. 
2011), Wanner v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 150 Idaho 164, 244 P.3d 1250(2011) and Williams v. 
State, 283 P.3d 127 (Ct. App. 2012). 
II 
6.2.2.2 The results for duplicate breath samples should correlate within 0.02 to indicate the absence of 
alcohol contamination in the subject/individual's breath pathway, show consistent sample 
delivery, and indicates the absence ofRFI as a contributing factor to the breath results. 
Idaho Standard Operating Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing, p. 15. 
12 
This argument is made subject to the objection that Mr. Trottier has asked for affirmative relief in setting out this 
and the following issues for consideration pursuant to IAR 35(b )( 4 ). 
13 
Common sense would suggest that Mr. Trottier wants to have the Court consider the outcome of the criminal case. 
Those pleadings were not submitted to the Department's Commercial Driver's License Disqualification Hearing 
Examiner and are clearly not relevant to these proceedings. 
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However, Mr. Trottier seems to argue that because the District Court had stayed the 
effectiveness of the Administrative License Suspension, that the Department was precluded from 
proceeding with the CDL disqualification. 
Mr. Trottier makes a policy argument not a due process argument, that the Department 
should not proceed with the CDL disqualification until the Administrative License Suspension 
has run its course. That decision is appropriately left to the Legislature and not the Court. 
This Court has maintained appropriately that the Administrative License Suspension 
pursuant to LC. § 18-8002 is entirely separate from the CDL disqualification pursuant to LC. § 
49-335, Buell v. Idaho Dept. of Transp., 151 Idaho 257, 254 P.3d 1253 (Ct.App. 2011) and 
Williams v. State, 283P.3d127 (Ct. App. 2012). 
Mr. Trottier has chosen to drive in a fashion to put his Commercial Driving Privileges at 
risk and should suffer the consequences accordingly, Williams at 140. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Trottier failed to meet his burden as required by LC. § 18-8002A(7). The Hearing 
Examiner's determination that Mr. Trottier should suffer an Administrative License Suspension 
and a lifetime disqualification of his Commercial Driving Privileges is supported by substantial 
evidence in the Record. 
The additional issues on appeal raised by Mr. Trottier should not be considered by the 
Court. If considered, the Commercial Driving Privileges Disqualification survives either a facial 
· or as applied substantive procedural due process challenge. 
Finally, no basis exists to supplement the Department's Administrative Record in either 
the Administrative License Suspension or the Disqualification of Mr. Trottier's Commercial 
Driving Privileges matters. 
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The decisions of the Department's Hearing Examiner in the Administrative License 
Suspension case and the Commercial Driving Privileges should be sustained and Mr. Trottier 
should suffer an Administrative License Suspension and a lifetime disqualification of his 
Commercial Driving Privileges. 
Respectfully Submitted this day of October, 2012. 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
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I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true 
And correct copy of the foregoing 
Document was: 
---
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Post Office 




John H. Walker 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 8447 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
On this _J__ day of October, 2012. 
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